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Recently Anthony Lester, Q.C., the famed British barrister and
world-renowned human rights advocate, delivered a speech entitled
"The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights."1 His focus was
on the Bill of Rights, although at the same time he accepted the
broader truth that, as Professor Albert P. Blaustein phrased it, "the
United States Constitution has inevitably been an influence for consti-
tutionalism. Every nation that has a one-document constitution (or is
committed in principle to having one) is inevitably following the United
States precedent-model." 2
One reason for the influence of the American Constitution abroad,
Professor Blaustein asserts, is "[t]he American penchant for constitu-
tional proselytizing. ... From the earliest days of the American revolu-
tionary movement, its leaders were conscious that they were doing
something of worldwide significance. They had convinced themselves
that they were creating a new Eden, not only for America but for all of
mankind. They had a story to tell and a message to deliver. They were
proselytizers."3
Perhaps these views reflect a degree of immodesty or perhaps only
an excess of enthusiasm. Yet, Mr. Lester informs us that today there is
an ever-increasing overseas trade in the American Bill of Rights that is
"brisk and vitally important."'4 It is, he says, a trade conducted both
internationally (before fora such as the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights) and nationally (in constitutional litigation in-
* 0 1991 by William J. Brennan, Jr.
William J. Brennan is a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States. This text was prepared for the speech Justice Brennan delivered at the
Columbia Law School Bicentennial Celebration (November 20, 1987). The Nova Law
Review wishes to thank Justice Brennan for his permission to publish the address.
1. Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 537 (1988).
2. A. BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD 7 (1986).
3. Id. at 12.
4. Lester, supra note 1, at 541.
1
Brennan: The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a Ch
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
volving norms derived from American constitutional law): "When life
or liberty is at stake [he asserts], the landmark judgments of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, giving fresh meaning to the princi-
ples of the Bill of Rights, are studied with as much attention in New
Delhi or Strausbourg, as they are in Washington, D.C., or the State of
Washington, or Springfield, Illinois." 5
These comments from such distinguished authorities as Mr. Lester
and Professor Blaustein prompt me tonight to essay an examination of
"The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a char-
ter of Human Rights."
The profound influence claimed for our Constitution on the nations
of the world has been attributed to many things. Ours was, of course,
the first written constitution in history. Moreover, as the charter of one
of the most powerful and largest nations on earth, our Constitution has
always been among the most conspicuous. And, as I already mentioned,
lest anyone dare forget its prominence, the Framers and their succes-
sors took it upon themselves to proselytize the Constitution abroad.
All those factors have, no doubt, contributed to our Constitution's
influence abroad, but they go only part way in explaining it. There
must be something about the Constitution's substance that accounts for
its worldwide appeal. That elusive something, I believe, is the Constitu-
tion's status as a charter of human rights. Three distinct characteristics
of American constitutionalism coalesce to distinguish our Constitution
as a human rights charter. First, is the very premise on which the Con-
stitution is based - that government springs from the People. Second,
is the Constitution's enumeration of specific rights that are guaranteed
against government intrusion. Third, and in my view most important, is
the Constitution's implementation of a mechanism - judicial enforce-
ment - that makes those enumerated rights meaningful. Those three
human-rights elements have, to varying degrees and in various ways,
infiltrated their way into the constitutional schemes of our neighbors
abroad.
Perhaps the Constitution's greatest innovation and undoubtedly its
most profound impact abroad is a concept that is today so well and
pervasively established that its revolutionary character is readily over-
looked. It is the very premise on which the Constitution is based -
that sovereign individuals, "We the People," can create a government.
Our Constitution was, in that respect, the ultimate effectuation of the
5. Id.
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Enlightenment, an effectuation that went beyond the wildest musings
even of some of the most prominent thinkers of the time. As one histo-
rian observes, the "European thinkers, in all their discussion of a politi-
cal or social contract, of government by consent and of sovereignty of
the people, had not clearly imagined the people as actually contriving a
constitution and creating the organs of government. They lacked the
idea of the people as a constituent power."6 Our Constitution, built on
that vision of the People as a constituent power, was itself a charter of
human rights and self determination, quite apart from its specific
content.
The vision caught like wildfire. Within two years, France ratified a
constitution which, although it lasted only two years, served as a model
for the 1812 Spanish constitution and the constitutions of Naples, Sic-
ily and much of Latin America. So, too, did Poland, whose constitution
recognized that "all authority in human society takes its beginning in
the will of the people." Shortly. thereafter, Venezuelans, Mexicans, and
Argentinians, to name a few, seized upon our Constitution as inspira-
tion to revolt against tyranny and oppression, and to fashion govern-
ments of the People. Today, there exist a total of 162 constitutions. All
but six nations - three that follow the Koran and three that are based
on the principle of parliamentary supremacy - either follow a written
constitution or (in the case of the twenty that have suspended their
constitutions) are committed to doing so.
Implicit in the notion that the People can and do create govern-
ment is the corollary that it is the People's prerogative and responsibil-
ity to limit the power of the government that they create. The Constitu-
tion's accommodation of that corollary, by enumerating individual
rights that the government may not invade, is the second, and perhaps
most conspicuous, attribute that distinguishes it as a charter of human
rights.
At the risk of preaching heresy, I will offer one simple admonition
about this second attribute: As human-rights achievements go, the
value of our Constitution's enumeration of specific rights, however con-
spicuous and however inspirational to our sister nations they may be,
ought not to be overrated. Let me explain. In so belittling the Constitu-
tion's enumeration of rights, I am referring neither to the Framers' ini-
tial decision to omit from its text all but a handful of what today we
consider fundamental rights, nor to the fact that its content was not
6. R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HIS-
TORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800 215 (1959).
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particularly novel.
As to the initial omission of a Bill of Rights: that decision in no
way suggests that the Framers considered those rights unimportant.
Rather, they were initially content to leave the protection of other
rights to the states, some of which had extraordinarily protective con-
stitutions. In fact, some of the Framers, Hamilton among them, es-
chewed explicit federal rights for fear that they might be understood
inferentially to permit the extension of federal powers beyond those
enumerated.7 Moreover, that the People themselves insisted on express
guarantees of certain fundamental rights as a condition for their ac-
ceptance of the Constitution evinces both the primacy and the foresight
of the People in creating - and limiting - government.
And as to the novelty of our Bill of Rights: Although it is true that
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man directly inspired the
Bill of Rights, the former in turn was inspired at least partially by the
constitutions of several of our own states, and authored in part by such
American notables as Thomas Jefferson and Gouverneur Morris.
I intend, therefore, to impugn neither the vigilance or the original-
ity of the Framers. My admonition boils down to the simple proposition
that merely to enumerate rights on paper is not to guarantee them.
Madison, himself, expressed doubts whether the "parchment barriers"
of declared rights would be effective in a republic.8 The rights of the
People - even if expressly enumerated - are not worth the parch-
ment they are written on if they are easily abrogated, unenforceable, or
anachronistic. So even if we cannot fairly credit the Framers of our
Constitution with the notion of enumerated individual rights, and even
if their articulation of those rights was less than original, we can still
acclaim the genius of a system that effectively implements, not just
enumerates, those rights.
A truly meaningful implementation of rights must, I think, include
at least three elements: stability, enforceability, and adaptability. By
"stability" I mean not necessarily permanence, but resistance to abro-
gation. A constitutional right is of little comfort if the government is
free whimsically to repeal it the moment it is invoked. Wary of the
fragility of constitutional guarantees, the Framers of our Constitution
devised an amendment process that all but precludes the diminution of
the textual rights. They made it extraordinarily difficult to amend any
of the Constitution's terms including the rights that were themselves
7. THE FEDERALIST, No. 84, at 537 (A. Hamilton) (B. F. Wright ed. 1961).
8. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 942, 943 (M. Peterson ed. 1984).
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appended by amendment.
With the hindsight of two centuries, that device might not seem
particularly remarkable. But comparing our Constitution's amendment
process to the permissive amendment processes that, until recently, pre-
vailed among most of our neighbors (with the notable exception of
Australia) evinces the Framers' wisdom. For the 150-year period fol-
lowing the ratification of our Constitution, it was common among Euro-
pean nations, for example, to permit amendment of their constitution
by the simple expedient of legislation. In fact, there evolved a practice
- as exemplified by the constitution of the Weimar Republic - of
qualifying every articulation of a particular right with the words, "un-
less the law provides otherwise." A legislative act could, under those
schemes, constitutionally abrogate any constitutional right.
Since World War II, however, a trend toward burdening the
amendment process has emerged. Such changes have been made often
with express attribution to our Constitution. The German experience is
most instructive. In reaction to Hitler's manipulation of the Weimar
constitution through parliament, Article 79 of the German constitution
requires that any amendment be accomplished expressly, and be ap-
proved by a two-thirds super-majority of both houses of parliament. In
practice, a constitutional amendment cannot pass unless supported by a
national consensus. And the German constitution squarely prohibits
any interference by amendment with the democratic order or basic
human rights.
The resistance of a proclamation of rights to convenient amend-
ment only goes part of the way toward full implementation of rights.
After all, without enforceability - that is, a mechanism by which to
enforce those rights - even an unalterable proclamation of rights
could amount to little more than an impotent proclamation. (In fact,
some would maintain that unenforceable pronouncements of rights are
not rights at all. But that is an issue that I leave to the philosophers
among us.) At any rate, the French Declaration of Rights of Man,
however well-intentioned and foresighted, fell to desuetude precisely
because it instituted no mechanism by which individuals could chal-
lenge infringement of the rights they purported to guarantee. The same
has been said of the extensive panoply of rights that the Soviet Consti-
tution purports to guarantee.
In the enforcement of constitutional rights under our system, the
judiciary plays the pivotal role. Since Chief Justice Marshall's holding
in Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
1991]
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duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is,"9 judicial re-
view has been accepted as a permanent and indispensable feature of
American constitutionalism. There is a sense in which judicial review is
decidedly counter-majoritarian. The judiciary does not sit to count
votes. It rests on the principle, expressed in the Constitution, that there
are circumstances in which the majority must yield to the greater na-
tional interest in the protection of rights.
Chief Justice Marshall was therefore quite understandably at
some pain, as Hamilton was in The Federalist, No. 78, to square judi-
cial review with America's dedication to government by the consent of
the governed. To cede to Congress the power claimed for the Supreme
Court would be to give the legislature "practical and real omnipo-
tence," making a mockery of the people's attempt "to limit a power, in
its own nature, illimitable." 10 The American people's chosen instrument
for keeping all their governors strictly within the limits of their as-
signed powers is the power of judicial review entrusted by that Consti-
tution to the Supreme Court.11 As Alpheus Mason has said:
Judicial review is an adjunct of democracy; without it, the supreme
will of the people, embodied in the Constitution, [c]ould be flouted,
and the distinction between fundamental law and ordinary acts of
Congress, would be broken down.... [Thus,] [w]hen the Court
upholds the Constitution and disregards an act of Congress con-
trary to it, what prevails is not the Court's will but the people's will
as embodied in the Constitution .... [J]udicial review sustains pop-
ular power; it does not disrupt it.1 2
The reception abroad of our Constitution's vision of judicial review
has, again, until recently, been lukewarm. In the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, a handful of nations, concentrated in Central America, adopted
schemes of judicial review patterned after ours. But they were excep-
tional; in most of the world, judicial review was not well-received. For
example, the Swiss ratified a constitution that expressly withdrew from
the judiciary any power to review legislation. England, for its part, has
also definitely rejected Blackstone's suggestion that the British courts
ought, in the exercise of their common-law powers, sometimes overrule
acts of Parliament.
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
10. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 88 (1962).
11. See id.
12. A. MASON, supra note 10, at 88-89.
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The concept of judicial review became infinitely more attractive
after World War II, once history has taught the somber lesson that
totalitarian regimes could make a mockery of constitutionally guaran-
teed rights in precisely the manner that Hamilton and Marshall had
feared 150 years earlier. Just as the movement began to stabilize con-
stitutions against convenient amendment, there emerged a trend toward
increased review of the popularly elected branches by a neutral branch,
shielded from popular control. I understand that varying degrees of ju-
dicial review have emerged in Germany, France, Italy, and Austria.
Perhaps the most important guardians of constitutional rights in Eu-
rope are the administrative courts (or councils of state) that review ex-
ecutive action for consistency with the constitution.
It seems clear that other nations have been influenced, at least
conceptually, by our Constitution's accommodation of the interests of
stability and enforceability in the implementation of rights. It is more
difficult to measure the impact abroad of the third requisite element of
meaningful rights implementation that I mentioned - flexibility in the
face of changing times. None of the Framers of our Constitution was so
optimistic or naive as to think that delineations of power on a piece of
parchment would prevent any attempted abuse of governmental power.
They were practical as well as wise men and we impugn their crafts-
manship if we assume that they were blind to the inevitability of con-
fficts among the federal branches, between the federal government and
the states, and between the individual and both governments. Of
course, they knew that turf battles would develop over what belonged
to which sovereignty, and how much either might infringe the liberty of
the individual. Such are the limitations of human imagination, that no
constitution could have delineated the precise boundaries of the author-
ity assigned the several repositories of governmental power. Nor, in the
nature of things, could the Framers have fashioned guidelines for the
resolution of the myriad collisions between power exercised by any of
these repositories, and the guarantees of individual liberty erected to
restrain governmental oppression whatever its source.
Accordingly, we know that the Framers' choice of general lan-
guage was deliberate. They were formulating a Constitution for the il-
limitable future. They wrote in broad outlines so that the past would
not too much govern the future. In recognition of the Framers' in-
tended flexibility, the Supreme Court has always breathed life into the
Constitution's words by reexamining its interpretation in light of the
changing times and emerging values.
There are those who find legitimacy in fidelity to what they call
1991]
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"the intentions of the Framers" or "original intent." In its most doctri-
naire incarnation, this view demands that judges attempt to discern ex-
actly what the Framers or ratifiers thought in 1789, or 1791, or 1866,
about the question under consideration in 1987 and simply follow that
intention in resolving the case before them. It is a view that feigns self-
effacing deference to the specific judgments of those who forged our
original social compact. But, I ask, how can we gauge accurately the
intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, contempo-
rary questions? All too often, sources of potential enlightenment such
as records of the ratification debates provide sparse or ambiguous evi-
dence of the original intention. Typically, all that can be gleaned is
that the Framers themselves disagreed about the application of particu-
lar constitutional provisions and cloaked their differences in generality,
or agreed only that the constitutional provision should not be governed
by their own specific intentions. Apart from the problematic nature of
the sources, our distance of two centuries cannot but work as a prism
refracting all we perceive. Those who would restrict claims of right to
the values of 1791 specifically articulated in the Constitution turn a
blind eye to social progress and eschew adaptation of overarching prin-
ciples to changes of social circumstance.
I frankly conclude that I approach my responsibility as a Justice
to read the Constitution in the only way that I can: as a Twentieth
Century American. I look to the text, to the history of the time of
framing, and to the intervening history of interpretation, of course. The
complexity and range of constitutional issues before the Court changes
to reflect the times. The Court's work is actually a daily mirror of the
battles of forces going on outside the Court. So the ultimate question
for me must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For
the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its
great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. The
Constitution's wisdom in other times cannot be their measure to the
vision of our time.
The vision of human dignity embodied in our Constitution
throughout most of its interpretive history is, at least for me, deeply
moving. It is timeless. It has inspired citizens of this country and others
for two centuries. If we are to continue to be an example to the nations
of the world, it will be because of our ceaseless pursuit of the constitu-
tional ideal of human dignity. The political and legal ideals that form
the foundation of much that is best in American institutions - ideals
jealously preserved and guarded throughout most of our history - still
[Vol. 15
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form the vital force in creative political thought and activity within the
nation today.
I close these remarks with the prayer with which Mr. Lester
closed his speech. "I hope that, [he prayed], during the third century of
the Constitution, the United States will accept that the obligation to
protect human rights is an international obligation to be accepted by
the United States themselves. I also hope that the United States judici-
ary will not retreat from the strong interpretation of the Bill of Rights
into literalism, positivism and historicism. If American human rights
are diminished, so are the rights of the rest of humanity."' 3 My re-
sponse is to repeat my conviction that as Americans we adopt our insti-
tutions to the ever-changing conditions of national and international
life, those ideals of human dignity - liberty and justice for all individ-
uals - will continue to inspire and guide us because they form the core
of our Constitution. The Constitution with its Bill of Rights thus has a
bright future, as well as a glorious past, for its spirit inheres in the
aspirations not only of all Americans, but of all the people throughout
the world who yearn for dignity and freedom.
13. Lester, supra note 1, at 561.
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